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A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF 
FINANCIAL REGULATION: INEFFICIENCY OF CAPITAL 
INTERMEDIATION IN A DEREGULATED SYSTEM 
WALLACE C. TURBEVILLE∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 The evaluation of the costs and benefits of limiting human activity 
through regulation is at the core of our government.  When the activ-
ity that would be restricted is commercial, many have a bias against 
regulation.  They assume that restricting activity reduces productivi-
ty in the economy to the detriment of wealth creation.  When a politi-
cian says that a rule is “unduly burdensome,” he or she means that 
the discernible benefits do not outweigh the wealth that would be cre-
ated if the rule did not exist.  Today, the most sophisticated and 
powerful articulation of this point of view concerns the regulation of 
the financial markets through financial markets reform under exist-
ing and potential future legislation. 
 This Article describes how this debate suffers from preconceptions 
that rely on unfounded economic theory and misconceptions based 
on the sheer complexity of modern finance. 
 It identifies the first step: defining how to measure the value to so-
ciety of a market structure that is bounded by a given set of regula-
tions.  The primary function of financial markets in this context is 
the intermediation of capital investment.  Efficiency can be measured 
by cost.  If the economic rent extracted by the financial sector for fa-
cilitating capital intermediation in a market construct is propor-
tionate to the value added by this activity, efficiency of the market 
structure is demonstrated. 
 This Article postulates that this has not been the case in recent 
years.  In doing so, it rejects the predominant approach to measuring 
efficiency that emphasizes the cost of individual financial transac-
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tions.  The predominant approach implicitly assumes that capital 
intermediation can be viewed as a linear path of a unit of invest-
ment from an investor to a productive use.  In this view, the costs of 
individual transactions along the way determine the cost of the capi-
tal intermediation process. 
 This Article makes the case that this is naïve or intentionally mis-
leading.  Modern capital and derivatives markets are exceedingly 
complex and involve multiple methods for extraction of value by the 
financial sector that must be paid for by the productive economy.  
This Article postulates that the amount extracted is demonstrably far 
higher than historic data and reasoned analysis suggest could possi-
bly be reasonable.  Therefore, the rents extracted by the financial sec-
tor for intermediating capital investment are inefficiently high. 
 Finally, this Article asserts that the costs and benefits of financial 
market regulation should not be biased by the assumption that the 
restriction of activities is a burden that must be offset by legitimate 
benefits such as safety and soundness of the system or even price 
transparency.  Under the proposed approach, regulations that reduce 
complexity or market power do not by definition burden the financial 
system in providing its essential social function but very likely en-
hance the efficiency of that process.1 
INTRODUCTION 
The debate that rages over regulations in the United States rep-
resents a long struggle to define the optimal role of government in 
society.  The debaters question what behaviors should be permitted or 
forbidden and what yardstick should be used to answer these ques-
tions.  Regulation of commercial activity impacts the economic per-
formance of the country and directly affects prosperity. 
Financial reform responsive to the financial crisis of 2008 and its 
role in the Great Recession is an important venue for that debate.  
The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 was historic in its breadth and the scale 
of its changes.2  Implementation of its provisions requires the prom-
ulgation of 236 separate rules, fewer than half of which have been 
completed as of this writing, more than two and a half years after en-
                                                        
 1.  This Article is adapted from Wallace C. Turbeville, Cracks in the Pipeline: Restoring 
Efficiency to Wall Street and Value to Main Street, DEMOS (Dec. 5, 2012), 
http://www.demos.org/publication/cracks-pipeline-restoring-efficiency-wall-street-and-
value-main-street. 
 2.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in various sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
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actment.3  Dodd-Frank is very different from the New Deal’s financial 
regulation, largely because of the complexity of today’s financial mar-
kets.  It identifies some activities that are prohibited as unacceptably 
risky.  For example, insured banks are prohibited from engaging in 
many types of proprietary trading activities under the “Volcker Rule.”4  
But, overwhelmingly, Dodd-Frank improves existing markets rather 
than changes them fundamentally, focusing on transparency (limiting 
the over-the-counter trading of derivatives); the upgrade of risk man-
agement procedures (required clearing of many derivatives, capital 
and margin requirements, and post-trade data reporting for financial 
firms); and oversight by prudential regulators (standards for the 
amounts and adequacy of bank capital and required living wills to re-
solve failed institutions). 
Regulation of the financial markets establishes boundaries within 
which these markets allocate capital to productive uses.  In this way, 
Dodd-Frank’s influence on the shape of the economy is strong.  In 
crafting the law, Congress implicitly weighed the costs and benefits of 
adopting the market structure that results from Dodd-Frank against 
alternatives, including the alternative of doing nothing.5  The agen-
cies responsible for crafting implementing regulations are legally re-
quired to take this weighing of costs and benefits to the next level of 
detail, often by explicit statutory provisions. 
As the agencies complete their work on the implementing rules, 
the next phase of the battle between the Goliath of the bank lobbyists 
and the David of the reform community will take place in the courts, 
particularly in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit.  The first skirmish involved the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s Proxy Access rules.6  The D.C. Circuit found the SEC’s 
“cost/benefit” analysis to be inadequate.7  This murky issue of costs 
and benefits promises to be the target of judicial review of all im-
portant financial reform rules. 
While the courts consider the financial reform regulations, Con-
gress continues the weighing process.  Those expressing concern over 
“burdensome” regulation are proposing to limit the Dodd-Frank legis-
                                                        
 3.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 13-195, REGULATORS HAVE FACED 
CHALLENGES FINALIZING KEY REFORMS AND UNADDRESSED AREAS POSE POTENTIAL RISKS 
(2013). 
 4.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376, § 619 (2010) (Volcker Rule to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(4)). 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Bus. Roundtable & Chamber of Commerce v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, No. 10-1305 
(D.C. Cir. filed July 22, 2011). 
 7.  Id. 
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lation,8 while others advocate broadening the scope of the law.9  In 
both cases, the proponents are dissatisfied with the balance of costs 
and benefits in the structure of the financial markets. 
From its inception, this debate over the best financial market 
structure in the post-financial-crisis world has avoided some basic 
questions.  Ground rules for measuring costs and benefits have been 
elusive and methodologies have been inconsistent.  As a result, a 
troubling assumption has lurked in the background.  There is general 
consensus that a recurrence of the consequences of the near collapse 
of the financial system in 2008 must be prevented.  But it is also fun-
damentally assumed that constraining the financial markets will im-
pede economic productivity.  Financial market regulation, therefore, 
is considered to be an inherently costly undertaking where the bene-
fits (such as reducing the risk of financial crises) perhaps make it 
worthwhile. 
The regime established by Dodd-Frank understandably gave pri-
ority to risk mitigation in response to the actual events of 2008.  Mas-
sive risk is an element of the modern financial system.  But risk and 
reward are generally symmetrical.  An economy disproportionately 
skewed toward rewarding the financial sector raises important struc-
tural issues that have yet to be addressed by laws and regulations.  The 
first step is to erase the preconception that regulations burden the ef-
ficient functioning of a market and that the good that regulations do 
must outweigh this burden. 
This Article will demonstrate that the concept of definitionally 
efficient unregulated trading markets is fundamentally flawed.  At its 
core, it is based on an incorrect measure of efficiency which leads an-
alysts to look in the wrong places when measuring frictions embedded 
in market structures and behaviors.  In the current discourse, effi-
ciency is almost uniformly measured by referencing the cost of indi-
vidual transactions.  But the principal social value of financial markets 
is not to assure the lowest transaction costs for market participants.  
Rather, it is to facilitate the efficient deployment of funds held by in-
vestors to productive uses.  In other words, markets are efficient if the 
cost to the entity putting capital to work productively is as close as 
possible to the price demanded by the entity that seeks a return on its 
investment, both measured comprehensively.  The entire difference 
                                                        
 8.  See, e.g., H.R. 1062, 112th Cong. (2012) (proposing the “Burdensome Data Collec-
tion Relief Act”). 
 9.  Letter from Rep. Keith Ellison to Ben Bernanke and Timothy Geithner (Sept. 24, 
2009), available at http://ellison.house.gov/images/stories/Documents/2009/Letter_to_ 
Bernanke_and_Geithner.pdf. 
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between the two is attributable to the plumbing that connects capital 
sources to capital uses, known as intermediation.  The economic 
rents10 extracted by intermediaries must be as low as possible to com-
pensate them for performing the essential intermediation service if 
the system is to work efficiently. 
Almost universally, this concept is lost in the discussion of finan-
cial markets.  Efficiency is expressed in terms of the cost of a securities 
or derivatives transaction.  This measures how well the markets work 
for traders.  But it is only one element of the cost of intermediation 
between capital sources and uses.  For reasons ranging from ideology 
to analytic sloth, the possibility that a market with low transaction 
costs can also be one in which intermediation costs are inefficiently 
high is ignored in public debate and academic analysis.  As the courts 
begin to review cost/benefit analysis for the massive number of rules 
promulgated by the regulatory agencies, it is important that they be 
directed to properly measured costs and benefits. 
Properly measured, the financial markets have become less effi-
cient in the era of deregulation even though conventional wisdom 
dictates that advances in information technology and quantitative 
analysis should have caused the opposite result.  Enormous sums of 
money are extracted from the capital intermediation process causing 
the financial sector share of the economy to grow at the expense of 
the productive manufacturing and service sectors and public finance.  
This trend must be reversed if the U.S. economy is to prosper and 
compete successfully in the world markets. 
Several factors contribute to this result.  Contrary to commonly 
held beliefs, advances in information technology and quantitative 
analysis have actually created asymmetries in information among trad-
ing market participants.  While up-to-date information related to fun-
damental value (for example, corporate financial reports, crop yields, 
government policies)11 is widely known today, these advances have 
been used by the more sophisticated and better-funded market partic-
ipants to detect, analyze, and often influence activities by other mar-
                                                        
 10.  A measure of market power, economic rent is the value in excess of marginal costs 
extracted by market participants.  See Economic A to Z Terms, ECONOMIST, available at 
http://www.economist.com/economics-a-to-z/r#node-21529784 (last visited June 21, 
2013). 
 11.  Fundamental value refers to the intrinsic value of a stock, bond, or derivative 
based on available information.  In the context of a share of stock, “Fundamental analysis 
entails the use of information in current and past financial statements, in conjunction with 
industry and macroeconomic data to arrive at a firm’s intrinsic value.”  S.P. Kothari, Capital 
Markets Research in Accounting (Mar. 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=235798. 
  
1178 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1173 
ket participants, and to then exploit advantages derived from this 
market non-fundamental information.12  In addition, complex in-
struments—primarily derivatives—are better understood by the finan-
cial institutions that market them than by their customers.  As a result, 
the financial institutions profit far more from the sale of these in-
struments than their customers realize. 
These two types of information advantage (and others) are sys-
tematically used to increase economic rents extracted from the in-
termediation process.  Changes in both the law governing banks and 
the underlying structure of the financial markets have allowed banks 
to exploit this informational advantage through capital intermedia-
tion.  The abandonment of the Glass-Steagall Act,13 which gave rise to 
multifunctional universal banks, as well as the elimination of several 
large banks during the financial crisis, led to dramatic consolidation 
in the financial service industry.14  The financial sector is now domi-
nated by a small number of large banks that enjoy tremendous market 
power.15  Because of powerful shared interests in the structure and 
process of the markets, these banks act as an oligopoly.16  Concentrat-
ed market power allows the oligopoly to use its information ad-
vantages and massive capital to extract value from the intermediation 
process on a large scale.  Dominant financial institutions systematical-
ly create market distortions and then exploit those distortions.  
Changes in the financial markets have similarly increased opportuni-
ties for capital intermediation.  The growth of pooled investment ve-
hicles, from pension funds to hedge funds to money market mutual 
funds and others, has changed the process of capital intermediation.17  
Much of the money that historically funded bank deposits has migrat-
ed to those vehicles.  The bank lending model for intermediation—
                                                        
 12.  The information asymmetry discussed in this Article is very different from the 
fundamental information inefficiencies addressed in a number of studies that examine the 
differing motivations of market participants.  For an excellent analysis of such fundamen-
tal information inefficiencies, see David A. Hirshleifer, Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing, 
56 J. FIN. 1533 (2001); Lynn Stout, Inefficient Markets and the New Finance, J. FIN. TRANS. 
(forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=729224. 
 13.  Glass-Steagall Act, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933). 
 14.  Sergei M. Guriev & Dmitriy Kvasov, Imperfect Competition in Financial Markets and 
Capital Structure (Aug. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=603721. 
 15.  See COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, OCC’S QUARTERLY 
REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES FOURTH QUARTER (2010). 
 16.  For an analysis of the post-Glass-Steagall oligopolistic behavior of banks in the debt 
and equity markets, see Guriev & Kvasov, supra note 14. 
 17.  See WILLIAM H. DONALDSON, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS (2003) (discussing the rise of pooled investment vehicles like 
hedge funds). 
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where depository banks move funds held as customer savings into cap-
ital investments—has been largely replaced by a trading market in-
termediation model.  In most cases, managers of pooled funds are 
judged by comparing transaction results with overall short-term mar-
ket results rather than by long-term results.18  The driving goal is to 
beat the market rather than to produce long-term results.  Since long-
term results are not emphasized, efficient intermediation between 
capital sources and uses is less valued by investors.19  This obscures in-
efficiencies from both the investors and consumers of capital who 
could discipline the system to increase efficiency if performance were 
measured by giving greater consideration to long-term growth of val-
ue.  It enables the extraction of value from the capital intermediation 
process by financial institutions. 
The consequences of extraction of value from capital intermedia-
tion by the dominant financial institutions reach far beyond unfair-
ness among market participants.  Inefficient capital intermediation 
exacts wide-ranging costs that severely burden the economy by re-
stricting the flow of capital to consumers, increasing the cost of con-
sumer goods, increasing the costs of productive projects, slowing job 
creation, and reducing the effectiveness of monetary policy.  Ineffi-
cient capital intermediation also reduces the self-correcting effect of 
supply and demand and excessively diverts wealth to the financial sec-
tor.  The net effects of these costs are widely apparent: lower produc-
tivity, more expensive goods, and fewer jobs. 
In recent years, the financial sector share of aggregate gross do-
mestic product (“GDP”) has been in the range of 8.3%, an increase 
from the historic level of 4.1%.20  By inferring that the historical in-
crease in financial sector share of GDP is attributable to the value di-
verted from capital intermediation, the excessive wealth transfer to 
the financial sector is in the range of $635 billion per year. 
These market inefficiencies also increase the likelihood that fi-
nancial crises, like the 2008 financial crisis, will recur.  Exploitation of 
market distortions is the root cause of the most recent financial crisis.  
Market participants with enormous market power are incentivized to 
increase the complexity of markets and to take excessive risks to reap 
                                                        
 18.  Robin M. Greenwood & David S. Scharfstein, The Growth of Modern Finance (July 1, 
2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2162179. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Justin Lahart, Number of the Week: Finance’s Share of Economy Continues to Grow, WALL 
ST. J. (Dec. 10, 2011), available at http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2011/12/10/number-
of-the-week-finances-share-of-economy-continues-to-grow/. 
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short-term gain, often by generating asset or debt bubbles.  Financial 
crises can be triggered by bursting price bubbles. 
If these root causes are not addressed by regulatory reforms, fu-
ture financial crises are inevitable.  After all, the banks themselves 
could have restrained their behavior prior to the crisis even if regula-
tions did not.  It should be obvious to all that the incentives to the 
banks in terms of outsized corporate profits must be immense to in-
duce behavior that put the bank at mortal risk.  The lure of immedi-
ate profits from the exercise of market power was simply too strong to 
allow rational prudence to prevail. 
I. UNDERPINNING OF THE GREAT DEREGULATION EXPERIMENT 
Commencing with President Reagan’s election in 1980, the fi-
nancial markets in the United States were totally transformed by three 
major developments: (1) advances in quantitative measurement of 
dynamic market price movements and information technology; (2) 
concentration of market power into a few large financial institutions; 
and (3) deregulation. 
The first development was the ability to quantify the future risks 
embedded in the market, apart from changes in fundamental value.21  
Instead of looking at economic data and financial statements, which 
are components in today’s price, traders could determine the statisti-
cal probability of price moves going forward.  They could ascribe a 
value to future price volatility and detach it from the underlying secu-
rity or commodity.  This was a precondition to the changes of the last 
three decades, and was essential to the rapid emergence of the $60 
trillion per year derivatives market, a market that barely existed be-
fore the 1990s.22 
Advances in information technology allowed near-real time valu-
ation of dynamic price movements and deployment of capital at high 
speeds to exploit this capability.  Previously, trading took place most 
often by telephone and was driven primarily by broad-based infor-
mation relevant to macro-economic data and information relevant to 
the fundamental value of specific securities and commodities.  Trad-
ing floors are now dominated by arrays of screens at every trader’s 
                                                        
 21.  For a definition of fundamental value, see supra note 10. 
 22.  Derivatives are contracts that obligate payment of cash based on asset market price 
movements.  The advent of derivatives allowed traders to detach price movement risk from 
assets and the Black-Scholes model allowed the resulting instruments to be valued.  See 
Wallace C. Turbeville, Derivatives: Innovation in the Era of Financial Regulation, DEMOS (June 
13, 2013), http://www.demos.org/publication/derivatives-innovation-era-financial-
regulation (discussing the history of and theory behind the Black-Scholes model). 
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desk, most tied directly to trading venues enabling instantaneous exe-
cution of trades.  Trading was transformed into an electronic business 
of massive volumes and complex strategies intended to profit from 
dynamic price movement rather than simple investment in assets 
based on their fundamental value.  Furthermore, the critically im-
portant regulatory framework that had defined the markets since the 
New Deal was utterly dismantled to remove all impediments to the 
new trading business. 
Commercial banking (taking deposits and making loans) had 
been separated from investment banking (proprietary trading of se-
curities and commodities) since the adoption of the Glass-Steagall Act 
in 1933.23  Banks that took in deposits and made loans were prohibit-
ed from trading securities and commodities.24  Throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s, regulators repeatedly undermined the separation of com-
mercial and investment banking.  The law was finally repealed in 1999 
by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.25  All banks could now trade for their 
own account and the race was on to accumulate vast stockpiles of fi-
nancial assets to increase the market power generated by marrying-up 
trading with the huge resources of depository banks.26  It was now the 
era of the so-called “universal bank” that could both take deposits and 
make loans and trade the financial markets. 
As repeal of Glass-Steagall approached, investment banking and 
commercial banking began a period of dramatic consolidation.  After 
its repeal, large commercial banks became universal banks through 
acquisition of investment banks or by launching new trading opera-
                                                        
 23.  Glass-Steagall Act, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933); see also Stephen P. Ken-
kel, Banking and Securities Law, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 736, 736 (1998) (“In passing the 
Glass-Steagall Act (Glass-Steagall or the Act), Congress attempted to separate commercial 
and investment banking.”). 
 24.  See Kenkel, supra note 23, at 738 (“Section 16 [of the Glass-Steagall Act] restricts 
the securities activities of Federal Reserve member banks ‘to purchasing and selling such 
securities and stock without recourse, solely upon the order, and for the account, of cus-
tomers. . . .’  Section 20 bars member banks from ‘affiliating’ with organizations ‘engaged 
principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution . . . of stocks, 
bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities.’  Section 21 prohibits any organization en-
gaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing securities from ac-
cepting deposits.  Finally, Section 32 prohibits the existence of interlocking management 
between member banks and firms engaged in the securities business.”). 
 25.  See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 
1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 219 
(2002) (“The GLB Act removed legal restrictions on affiliations between banks and securi-
ties firms by repealing two provisions of a 1933 statute popularly known as the ‘Glass-
Steagall Act.’”). 
 26.  See id. (“As a result of the GLB Act, banks can combine with securities firms and 
insurance companies to organize financial conglomerates under the structure of a ‘finan-
cial holding company.’”). 
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tions.  Finally, during the crisis, Bear Stearns was scooped up by JP 
Morgan Chase and Bank of America absorbed Merrill Lynch, both 
with the direct involvement of the government.  Weeks later, Morgan 
Stanley and Goldman Sachs converted to banks to steady themselves 
in the turmoil.  Investment banks, other than regional and boutique 
investment banks, ceased to exist as a separate category from com-
mercial banks. 
The consolidation was widespread, resulting in a system of mega-
banks, an oligopoly with vast market power.27 While there is no availa-
ble comprehensive study of oligopoly behavior in the trading markets, 
the banks engage in specific trading activities that are consistent with 
this behavior.  And one need only consider the reports of the investi-
gation into the manipulation of the London Inter-bank Offered Rate 
(“LIBOR”) as an example of this behavior.28 
Recent research by the Dallas Fed provides a window on this pro-
cess.29  The study observes that in 1970 the top five banks in terms of 
assets held 17% of aggregate bank assets.  By 2010, the top five banks 
held 52% of aggregate assets.30 
In parallel, the newly created derivatives market was exempted 
from all meaningful regulation in the Commodity Futures Moderniza-
tion Act of 2000.  Derivatives, dubbed by Warren Buffet as “financial 
instruments of mass destruction,”31 were to be unregulated, creating a 
new, massively risky market overnight.  Universal banks were handed 
an opportunity to dominate another trading market, one perfectly de-
signed for their information and quantitative advantages—the four 
largest banks currently control 94% of the bank derivatives business in 
the United States.32 
                                                        
 27.  See Guriev & Kvasov, supra note 14 (analyzing the post Glass-Steagall oligopolistic 
behavior of banks in the debt and equity markets). 
 28.  Reed Albergotti & Jean Eaglesham, 9 More Banks Subpoenaed over LIBOR, WALL ST. 
J., Oct. 25, 2012, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702038974045 
78079413742864842.html.  The breadth of the investigation suggests that many large 
banks were aware of the practice and simply joined in to secure their share of the profits, a 
concerted effort by the large universal banks to manipulate a system affecting a broad 
swath of the public. 
 29.  FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALL., 2011 ANNUAL REPORT: CHOOSING THE ROAD TO 
PROSPERITY (2011). 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  WARREN BUFFET, BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY ANNUAL REPORT: LETTER TO 
SHAREHOLDERS 15 (2002), available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2002ar/2002ar 
.pdf. 
 32.  OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK 
TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES—FIRST QUARTER 2012 (2012), available at 
http://occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/trading/derivatives/derivatives-
quarterly-report.html. 
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II. UNDERSTANDING THE FINANCIAL MARKET SYSTEM 
There is a common understanding that financial markets work by 
constantly finding an equilibrium that is defined by fundamental val-
ue.  If the markets are large enough and if the information relevant to 
fundamental value is equally accessible, prices of securities and com-
modities will be forced toward the theoretically correct levels by com-
petition among traders.  Since all participants are equally motivated 
by greed, high transaction volume will quickly erase any price anoma-
ly or inefficiency.  Individual greed will be canceled out by universal 
greed. 
The foundation for this way of thinking is the efficient market 
hypothesis,33 whose most famous devotee is Alan Greenspan.34  Under 
the hypothesis, no regulation is the best regulation.  This is complete-
ly simpatico with the conservative ideology of the Reagan administra-
tion and its successors.  It became the foundation of pre-financial cri-
sis policy on financial regulation. 
A corollary to the efficient market hypothesis is the representa-
tive agent model.35  If price anomalies and inefficiencies are instanta-
neously eradicated, individual motivations and quirks of market struc-
tures are irrelevant.36  The marketplace can be viewed as monolithic 
for purposes of analysis.  Academic and other experts adopted this 
model and systematically de-emphasized factors other than the com-
mon interest in optimizing market value.37  Having adopted the repre-
sentative agent model, academic research ignored the potential for a 
system dominated by the exploitation of distortions often created by 
individual agents. 
The representative agent model affects the approach to regula-
tion dramatically.  Certainly, bad behavior can be proscribed, such as 
fraud or market manipulation.  But the representative agent model 
causes the rule makers to set standards that require greater culpability 
as a precondition to rule violation.  If trading activity in pursuit of 
greed is good, no one activity should be singled out unless it is hei-
nous in the extreme.  This is an institutional reason that so few partic-
                                                        
 33.  The hypothesis was originally articulated by University of Chicago economist Eu-
gene Fama in 1970.  Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical 
Work, 25 J. FIN. 2 (1970). 
 34.  Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics (Princeton Univ., 
CEPS Working Paper No. 91, 2003). 
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ipants in the financial market debacle have been taken to task in legal 
proceedings. 
History has not been kind to the efficient market hypothesis.  As 
Greenspan famously observed, the events of the financial crisis could 
not have existed under such a market cosmology.38  Instead, the mar-
ket was riddled with misinformation and conflicts of interest.39  Mar-
ket participants did not act to preserve the integrity of the market as 
predicted by the hypothesis.40  They acted to maximize short-term 
profits (and their bonuses) until the music finally stopped, precipitat-
ing bankruptcy or bailout.41  Contrary to the representative agent 
model, the pursuit of narrow interests determined outcomes.  Market 
participants were not monolithic at all.  Their actual behavior resem-
bled the lifeboat evacuation of the Titanic, with similar inefficient 
consequences. 
The economic model that better fits with the events of the recent 
past is that of economist Hyman Minsky: “[O]nce we admit that insti-
tutions are man-made and at least in part the product of conscious 
decision, we must also face the effects of institutional arrangements 
on social results.”42  He argues “that almost all systems which are mul-
tidimensional, nonlinear, and time dependent are endogenously un-
stable.”43 In Minsky’s view, periods of market stability are destabilizing 
and markets are inescapably incoherent.  Markets are not predictably 
efficient.  They are similar to a fluid system influenced by multiple 
forces that are difficult to either predict or measure.  A price can be 
formed in a market, but contemplation of its perfection is a futile 
task. 
Today’s markets are far more consistent with Minsky’s theories.  
While some information is broadly shared by market participants (the 
essential assumption of the efficient market hypothesis), the ever-
increasing speed and capacity of information technology assures that 
the more powerful market participants will always enjoy an infor-
mation advantage.  Especially in modern, high-speed markets, the 
perception of facts is the driving force.  Perceptions can be altered.  
                                                        
 38.  Bryan Knowlton & Michael M. Grynbaum, Greenspan “Shocked” That Free Markets Are 
Flawed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/23/ 
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 39.  PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOMELAND SECURITY & 
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 40.  Id. 
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 43.  Id. at 11 n.9. 
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Altered perceptions of current circumstances created by information 
asymmetries, even for small periods of time, can introduce tremen-
dous distortions. 
This reality undermines the concept that markets behave like 
natural systems in equilibrium.  Thus, other system concepts must ex-
plain them better.  Fluid systems, described by chaos theory, are not 
good comparisons.  The basic principle of chaos theory is that future 
outcomes cannot be predicted even if one has all relevant infor-
mation about current conditions.  In financial markets, cause and ef-
fect is relatively clear.  It is, however, difficult to know when the effect 
may occur and whether it will happen at a single time or in stages. 
There is a third possibility: self-organized criticality.  This system 
construct was articulated by the physicist Per Bak and likens natural 
systems to tectonic plates.44  It is entirely predictable that earthquakes 
will occur, but it appears to be impossible to forecast when and in 
what stages the forces built up by plate movements will be released.  
The example provided by Professor Bak is a child dribbling sand into 
a pile at the beach.45  At first the size and shape of the pile is predicta-
ble.46  As the pile accretes, however, it will reach a point of criticality 
that results in an avalanche.47  How and when this occurs depends on 
the complexity of the system, that is to say the irregularity of the 
grains of sand that hold the pile together by friction as forces accumu-
late only to be released in the avalanche.48  If the system were less 
complex, for instance if the particles were smooth like marbles, the 
force would not accumulate but would be released constantly. 
Self-organized criticality aptly describes modern financial mar-
kets.  The markets are characterized by booms (mortgages, dot-com 
stocks) and busts (financial crisis).  This is very different from a sys-
tem in constant equilibrium. 
The application of Professor Bak’s construct has extraordinary 
implications for evaluating the costs and benefits of regulation.  It 
suggests how regulation should best be crafted to shape markets that 
efficiently price and deploy capita.  Self-organized criticality derives 
from the complexity of the system.  Thus reducing complexity has 
value in and of itself by mitigating the violence of the type of ava-
lanche that we call a financial crisis.  Instead of shying away from di-
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rectly restricting transactions that create complexity, it should be a 
goal. 
III. PERFORMANCE OF THE DEREGULATED MARKETS 
If deregulated financial markets can best be described by self-
organized criticality, complexity might still be a benefit to the econo-
my if the markets are performing their social functions more efficient-
ly than they might otherwise.  One need only compare the increased 
financial sector compensation levels that accompanied deregulation 
with the persistent unemployment that follows recessions and income 
and wealth disparity to see that they are not.49  In the referenced arti-
cle, I describe connections between deregulation and profits and 
their share of the economy. 
It is not simply that the financial sector has been extremely prof-
itable, though it has been.  During the thirty-five years of deregula-
tion, the financial sector share of the economy has increased to un-
precedented levels, growing from 3.8% to 8.2% of the GDP,50 while 
the manufacturing and services sectors have become relatively small-
er.  The trend is not caused by exporting financial services to foreign 
nations.51  Instead, the modern financial services sector is profiting by 
extracting the value that it delivers to the rest of the U.S. economy.  
This phenomenon is structural. 
Aside from insurance and payment systems, the essential service 
of the financial sector is capital intermediation.52  Sources of capital, 
such as savings and pension funds, must be matched up with users of 
capital who are financing productive activities.53  The overwhelming 
value that is extracted by the financial sector, which relates to its prof-
itability and share of GDP, is extracted from capital intermediation in 
various forms.54  The efficiency of the matching systems is a function 
of fundamental capital cost and the cost of intermediation.  The price 
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paid for intermediation must be rationally related to the service pro-
vided.  In terms used by economists, the economic rent extracted for 
capital intermediation must be optimally small. 
A recent study of intermediation costs by Thomas Philippon of 
New York University’s Stern School of Management addressed the 
causes of the current large financial sector share of the economy.55  
Professor Philippon used the neoclassical growth model to examine 
financial intermediation in the United States over a 140-year period.  
He constructed an index that measures the unit cost of financial in-
termediation to show that the finance industry has become less effi-
cient in providing intermediation services over time.56  He summa-
rized his findings as follows: 
[T]he finance cost index has increased since the mid-1970s.  
This is counter-intuitive.  If anything, the development of in-
formation technologies (IT) over the past 40 years should 
have disproportionately increased efficiency in the finance 
industry.  How is it possible for today’s finance industry not 
to be significantly more efficient than the finance industry of 
John Pierpont Morgan a century ago?  [The historic trends] 
present[] a puzzle for future research.57 
Finance has obviously benefited from the IT revolution, which 
has dramatically lowered the cost of retail finance.  Yet, even when ac-
counting for all the financial assets created in the United States, the 
cost of intermediation appears to have increased.  Why is the non-
financial sector transferring so much income to the financial sector?  
Professor Philippon concludes that, mechanically, the reason is an 
enormous increase in trading.58 
The study indicates that the cost of intermediation between the 
suppliers of capital and the productive consumers of capital has in-
creased notwithstanding technology advances, sophisticated quantita-
tive analysis, massive trading volume increases, and diversity in securi-
ties and derivatives markets.59 
The only time over the 140-year period that Professor Philippon’s 
financial intermediation cost index was comparable to the period of 
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deregulation was the Great Depression.60  High costs of intermedia-
tion make sense in the Great Depression when intermediation virtual-
ly ceased to exist—there was even a bank holiday for a period.  But in 
the deregulation period, banks were profitable and the supply of fi-
nancing was plentiful.  Reasoning under the tenets of the efficient 
market hypothesis, the professor correctly concludes that this is abso-
lutely counter-intuitive.  But from the perspective of an observer of 
trading behavior and market evolution, his results make perfect sense. 
Thinking of the financial markets in the context of self-organized 
criticality allows us to see behind Professor Philippon’s reference to 
“an enormous increase in trading.”61  Complexity is the key to under-
standing the massive inefficiency of capital intermediation and in-
creased volume is merely a byproduct of increased complexity. 
By understanding how complexity fuels inefficiency we can better 
understand why the financial sector has incentives to increase com-
plexity and why this leads to financial crises.  Asymmetric information 
allows those market participants with better information to consistent-
ly earn more from trading than others.62  Complexity allows more ef-
fective deployment of information asymmetry advantages since the 
available information is more difficult to discern and analyze. 
The remainder of this Article examines real world applications of 
asymmetry.  First, it looks at high frequency trading, which is driven 
by information technology.  It then examines derivatives, which in-
volve advanced quantitative analysis. These examples of the two forms 
of information asymmetry are by no means exclusive, but they are the 
most visible.  Regulations that limit these two activities should not be 
seen as burdening marked efficiency.  In contrast, such regulations 
should be assumed to increase efficiency of capital intermediation. 
IV.  HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING (“HFT”) 
If asked to describe the role of a financial market structure, a 
trading professional will virtually always say that it is to facilitate li-
quidity so that transactions can be accomplished efficiently and at a 
low cost.  This makes sense because the compensation of traders and 
fund managers is related to transaction costs. 
Properly used, efficient liquidity for a given transaction refers to 
market conditions needed so that initiation of the transaction will 
not, by itself, alter the best available transaction price.  If, for exam-
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ple, a large number of willing buyers are active in a market, a seller is 
more likely to receive the highest going price for a sale he posts to the 
marketplace seeking a bid.  There is depth in the buying interest at 
the best going price that is sufficient to absorb the sale. 
A large number of transactions taking place in a market generally 
means that transaction liquidity will be high and the seller is more 
likely to receive the price most recently bid to other sellers when his 
posted offer to sell is matched with a buyer.  This assumes that high 
volume information traders, those whose strategy is to enter and exit 
the market quickly to take advantage of superior information, are 
consistently willing to transact at the going market prices and provide 
liquidity.  In the modern markets, most information traders employ 
powerful computers driven by algorithms that can switch from provid-
ing liquidity to liquidity consumption instantaneously. 
During any observation period, the price paid by capital consum-
ers should be greater than the price received by capital investors.  
Traders must be compensated for intermediation, after all.  It is often 
assumed that when the spread between the prices at which traders can 
buy and sell is as low as it can be, intermediation is efficient.  Capital 
intermediation is relatively inefficient.63  If the enormous increase in 
volume of trading in today’s market represented by HFT is providing 
liquidity and lowering that spread, how can intermediation be ineffi-
cient? 
High frequency trading has been defined as “fully automated 
trading strategies with very high trading volume and extremely short 
holding periods ranging from milliseconds to minutes and possibly 
hours.”64  At the speed of HFT transaction execution, no human deci-
sion-making is possible.  The decisions are driven by algorithms that 
dictate the placement of orders and purchases or sales based on ob-
served market conditions.  A computer-driven trading operation en-
slaved to an algorithm is like a “trader-bot,” intended to act just like a 
human trader but at high speed.  As we shall see, this intent cannot be 
fulfilled because the flexibility of algorithms is limited. 
High frequency trading is pervasive, especially in the equities 
markets where it has been estimated that it represents 73% of all vol-
ume.65  It has changed fundamental characteristics of markets.  At the 
end of World War II, the average holding period for stocks was four 
                                                        
 63.  See Philippon, Less Efficient?, supra note 55, at 16–17. 
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years.  By the turn of the millennium, it was eight months.  By 2008, 
the average holding period declined to two months.  And by 2011, it 
has been estimated that, at least for actively traded stocks, it had de-
clined to twenty-two seconds.66 
While there has been speculation that high frequency trading 
may have declined recently, a November 2012 study funded by the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission focusing on HFT profitabil-
ity in the equities futures market, an integral element of the equities 
market, finds that the percentage share of HFT in that sector has re-
mained constant.67  High frequency trading is the dominant form of 
information trader activity and a likely source of value extraction from 
the capital intermediation process. 
The inquiry into the flash crash of May 2010 resulted in a study 
of market dynamics during that event by Andrei Kirilenko, the chief 
economist of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and oth-
ers.68  On May 6, 2010, the Dow Jones Average plunged over 1000 
points in a matter of minutes.69  This represented approximately $1 
trillion of market value.70  The culprit most cited was a mutual fund 
whose algorithms governing trading tactics triggered a $4 billion sale 
of equity instruments, on a day when the market was particularly 
shaky, with insufficient regard to price.71  The market soon recovered, 
but the mayhem caused by the rapid moves was substantial.72  Fortu-
nately, the flash crash occurred in the early afternoon allowing time 
for the market to recover. 
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The Kirilenko study targeted the role of algorithmic, high fre-
quency trading as it interacted with the initial aberrant price move 
caused by the mutual fund.73  The study contrasted behavior of HFTs 
and market makers, who, unlike information traders, profit in the 
market from the spread between purchase prices and sale prices ra-
ther than price movement.74  The study showed that market makers 
tended to moderate the price moves because they did not instantane-
ously exit the markets, dumping inventories on the way out.75  In con-
trast, HFTs, who seek to profit from price moves at high speed, exac-
erbated the flash crash by reacting, en masse, to price moves 
automatically as their systems responded to unusual market moves in 
ways dictated by their governing algorithms.76  Kirilenko has described 
an “ecosystem of market participants” that interacted through algo-
rithms and high-speed trading systems to create a serious stock mar-
ket anomaly.77 
The study demonstrates that there is a great distinction between 
volume and market liquidity.  For example, algorithmic trading activi-
ty can amplify the price effect of a given market event.78  Prior to an 
event, market participants misperceive the volume generated by the 
algorithmic traders as stabilizing liquidity.  Yet the systems are rigged 
to exit the market and dump inventories at the worst possible time, in 
terms of stability.  When an event occurs, the “stabilizing liquidity” 
converts instantaneously into trading that consumes massive amounts 
of liquidity.  The perceived stabilizing liquidity is an illusion, an even 
more disruptive circumstance than if the illusory stabilizing liquidity 
had never existed at all. 
The 2010 flash crash was a dramatic example of events that occur 
daily in the markets.79  Mini-flash crashes distort markets repeatedly, 
causing prices to be unreliable and volatile.  A recent study likewise 
found that high frequency trading is positively correlated with stock 
price volatility, after controlling for fundamental volatility and other 
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exogenous determinants.80  The study identifies intra-day volatility 
that is actually a series of mini-flash crashes.81 
The point is made eloquently by Eric Hunsader, the founder of 
Nanex, a high speed market date feed service:  
 In summary, HFT algos reduce the value of resting orders 
[for example, a market maker’s orders] and increase the 
value of how fast orders can be placed and cancelled.  This 
results in the illusion of liquidity.  We can’t understand why 
this is allowed to continue, because at the core, it is pure 
manipulation.82 
But what about the time periods in which HFTs are not exiting 
the marketplace precipitously?  After all, a number of studies have 
concluded that HFT provides benefits.83  These studies, however, fo-
cus on lower individual transaction costs.  It is reasonable to find a 
benefit if the focus is narrowed to that level. 
Another study focuses instead on the effect on the narrower class 
of market participants who merely intend to make investments.84  This 
class of traders is referred to as value investors.  The study also dis-
cusses the effect on HFT on market makers and information traders 
whose activities establish the spread between available purchase and 
sale prices.85  The study characterizes the basic purpose of HFT as the 
use of speed to insert the HFT trader in between value investors and 
market makers.86  The idea is to buy from or sell to a value investor 
and instantaneously sell to or buy from a market maker.  The study 
concludes that the prices paid or received by value investors are ad-
versely affected because liquidity-providing market makers adjust their 
price demands to compensate for the value extracted by HFTs.87 
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In other words, individual transaction costs are not increased but 
absolute price levels are altered to the detriment of the value inves-
tors, especially large institutional investors that transact large posi-
tions.  Since value investors make their decision to invest based on re-
turn on funds invested, prices must adjust to compensate for the lost 
value.88 
Investors don’t merely buy a security and passively hold it.  They 
invest in the market price for the security over time.89  Further, they 
periodically replace the security by selling and acquiring another se-
curity.  Valuation of an investment security and its successive replace-
ments depends on the dynamic market price over time.90  The inves-
tors mark the position representing the successive securities to 
current market prices daily.91  Each day, they make the decision to 
hold the security or to replace it using these marks.  When the inves-
tor allocates a sum of money to investment, he is investing in a series 
of daily transactions, including the decision to hold the security, that 
are affected by the changing fundamental value of the security and its 
successors, but also by the market activities of others that affect daily 
valuation via non-fundamental forces.92 
When a business or government issues debt or equity, the price it 
receives is determined by the expected return required to induce in-
vestors to transact.  If the expected return is uncertain, the price paid 
by the investor must be lower to compensate for uncertainty.  The re-
turn may be uncertain because the business or government is risky 
from a fundamental value perspective, but it may also be uncertain 
because of market unreliability.  For example, if the market lacks reli-
able liquidity for the security, the ongoing value is subject to price risk 
over and above fundamental value risk.93  Liquidity may not be suffi-
ciently high to generate purchases and sales at the fundamentally 
sound price over time.94  The cause is likely to be information trader 
activity that consumes liquidity either consistently or periodically.95 
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Investment is not a structured process in which dollars can be 
tagged and traced through a linear series of transactions.  There is a 
value extraction return premium attached to a security that is set by 
value investors to offset the cost of future market disruption.  When a 
business or government raises money in the market, it pays that pre-
mium to the value investors.  But the reason the value investors re-
quire the premium is that they know they must pay it back to infor-
mation traders over time as a result of unreliable valuation prior to 
and at the time the position is liquidated or replaced.  The premium 
ultimately is paid to HFTs as they extract value from the market on a 
daily basis. 
The best empirical evidence of this is probably the financial sec-
tor’s increased share of GDP and profits in the economy as a whole, as 
described above.  No sector of the economy is better suited to benefit 
from advances in information technology and quantitative analysis.  
Furthermore, the rise of mutual funds and other aggregated invest-
ment funds has increased the scale of investment activities.  The fi-
nancial sector should be able to perform the intermediation function 
far more efficiently than in the past.  On a transaction-by-transaction 
basis, these advances have resulted in lower transaction spreads as 
markets volumes have increased.  Thus, the increased share of the 
economy represented by the financial sector, occurring simultaneous-
ly with transaction efficiencies that have had the effect of reducing 
the share, indicates that a substantial portion of market activity ex-
tracts value from the overall capital intermediation process. 
In addition, the CFTC-sponsored study on profitability of HFTs 
cited above demonstrates persistent and substantial profitability for 
this large element of the trading market even though the risk taken 
on to earn this profit is very small.96  Consistent profit, in excess of the 
going spread between purchase and sale prices with very little risk, 
means that the HFTs are extracting value based on structural, rather 
than fundamental, information.  There is simply no other way that 
these conditions could co-exist.  The HFTs are reaping the value ex-
traction return premium that they caused to exist.  And the persistent 
large profit that is disproportionate to risk means that the value ex-
tracted far exceeds liquidity benefits. 
V.  DERIVATIVES 
Derivatives are the foundation for most of the financial engineer-
ing of the last thirty-five years.  Valuation and risk metrics for deriva-
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tives involve devilishly complex mathematics, but their structure is 
relatively straightforward.97  One need not be a quant98 to understand 
how they work and how they affect the efficiency of capital markets.99 
A.  Basic Properties of Derivatives. 
As a threshold matter, it is essential to understand a few basic 
principles underlying derivatives.  Financial institutions consistently 
describe derivatives in language that is designed to make them appear 
benign to customers and regulators.100  Derivatives are characterized 
as financial products that reduce risk.101  This facile description is par-
roted by academics and policymakers.102  A new and more accurate 
description is badly needed. 
The fundamental characteristic of a derivative is that it is a bilat-
eral contract between two parties, requiring performance in the fu-
ture.103  It is not an asset like a share of stock or a barrel of oil.  An ex-
isting derivative is not sold to another party.  If a derivative 
counterparty wants to eliminate the derivative price risk from its book, 
it must enter into a contract that is the same, but take on the opposite 
obligations.104  The new opposite-way derivative offsets the first deriva-
tive, but only if the party on the other side performs its obligations.105 
The value to a counterparty of a derivative on any given day dur-
ing its life involves two central properties of the contract: (1) The ex-
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pected financial value of the performance in the future by the other 
party to the contract; and (2) the likelihood that the required per-
formance by the other party will not occur and that the expected fi-
nancial value will not be realized.  The values of these properties can 
be, and typically are, measured independently.  Measurement of these 
values and how they interact, even for a simply structured derivative, is 
a complex task.106 
A swap is a type of derivative contract to exchange one value for 
another, the value most often being the price of a security or other 
asset (the referenced asset).107  Swaps are structured on hundreds of 
different prices, including prices of equity shares, currencies, energy 
and agricultural commodities, precious and commercial metals, and 
debt.108 
The basic building blocks of swaps are forward prices.109  A for-
ward price, as of any date, is the expected price of a referenced asset 
on a specified date in the future.  The expectation is represented by 
other recent contracts on the same forward price, an agreed index, or 
sometimes even an estimate by one of the parties to the contract.  For 
example, a simple oil price swap is based on the forward price assum-
ing a future delivery date and location and a quantity.  A common 
contract might refer to June delivery of 100 barrels of crude oil at 
Cushing, Oklahoma, a major distribution pipeline hub. 
One of the values to be exchanged in the future may be fixed 
and determined at the inception of the contract.110  In this case, the 
performance required of one of the parties (“Party A”) is payment of 
a set dollar amount.111  This payment is calculated in our oil swap ex-
ample as the market value, at the inception of the swap, of 100 barrels 
of oil to be delivered in June at Cushing, Oklahoma.  If the current 
forward price for a barrel of oil to be delivered in June is $100, a swap 
on 100 barrels of oil would require a fixed payment by Party A in June 
of $10,000. 
At least one of the values to be paid under a swap is an amount 
based on a price to be determined definitively in the future.112  In our 
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example, the other party to the oil price swap (“Party B”) is required 
to pay an amount in June equal to the then current price of 100 barrels 
of oil delivered at Cushing.  Thus, the values exchanged on perfor-
mance of the contract are the forward price for oil delivered in June 
at inception and the actual price for oil delivered in June. 
For Party A, the realized financial value of the future perfor-
mance of Party B depends on the delivery price in June.  If that price 
is higher than the forward price at inception of the swap (Party A’s 
fixed payment obligation), the swap will have a positive value for Party 
A equal to the excess.  If it is lower, the swap will have a negative value 
to Party A equal to the amount the price has gone down since incep-
tion.  Party B’s value in each of these cases will be the inverse.  To put 
numbers on it, remember the example in which the June forward 
price of oil was $100 per barrel at the inception of the swap, resulting 
in a fixed payment by Party A of $10,000.  If the price per barrel is 
$120 on the performance date in June, Party B will be required to pay 
$12,000.  After netting out the fixed payment by Party A, Party B is out 
$2000, which is also the benefit to Party A.  But if the price is $80 per 
barrel, Party B will receive, and Party A will pay, $2000 on a net basis. 
On each date prior to the definitive determination of the floating 
payment (Party B’s performance obligation), the accrued value of the 
swap is based on the forward price on that date.  Thus, the dynamic 
value of any derivative is dependent on the movement of a referenced 
forward price over a specified time period. 
Assuming that the fixed payment (made by Party A) is accurately 
based on the June Cushing forward price at inception, the swap ini-
tially has no intrinsic financial value.  At inception, the expected 
amount to be paid by Party B is the same as the fixed amount to be 
paid by Party A.  As soon as June Cushing forward price changes, 
however, value accrues.  If the price increases the very next day after 
inception by $1, Party A accrues that positive value; if it decreases by 
$1, the accrued positive value is Party B’s.  The counterparty in each 
case accrues an equal negative value. 
But, in contrast with this accrued value, the realized financial val-
ue is not actually known until performance is completed.  The swap is 
a contract that has realized value only if the other party performs.113  It 
is not an asset that can be converted to cash by selling it on a date 
chosen by the owner.  If Party A accrues a $1 value for each barrel, 
that value is at risk if Party B goes bankrupt or otherwise fails to per-
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form.  Party A is exposed to the credit of Party B.  Party A can replace 
the swap immediately if Party B goes bankrupt.  But the replacement 
swap will have a new inception date and, on that date, the June for-
ward price is $1 higher in our example.  Therefore, the fixed payment 
is based on a $1 higher price for 100 barrels.  The consequence to 
Party A when June comes around is $100 worse. 
This consequence of insolvency of Party B prior to performance 
is exactly the same as if Party A had loaned $100 to Party B and then 
Party B went bust.  Party A has extended credit to Party B.  That is ex-
actly how sophisticated market participants, like banks, view swaps. 
This view illustrates the second embedded property of a swap 
that determines its value.  At any time the swap has a financial value 
based on the current forward price; but it also involves an extension 
of credit that has a separate value or cost.114  In a loan, this value and 
cost is expressed as an interest rate.  In a derivative, the credit exten-
sion has a parallel value or cost, but it its expression is obscured be-
cause it is embedded in the pricing of the swap.  For example, the 
floating leg of the swap may be the June Cushing price less fifty cents.  
This means that the swap has intrinsic value that compensates Party A 
for the potential extension of credit to Party B.  Sophisticated deriva-
tives counterparties price in potential credit extension using complex 
statistics, especially if they have market power to demand it. 
B.  Valuation of Cost of Derivatives to Capital Intermediation. 
Capital intermediation is the process of matching available in-
vestment funds with productive uses of capital investment.115  Mis-
matches can be based on supply and demand.  But, there are other 
mismatches that arise from particular needs of investors and business-
es and governments. 
Derivatives are an integral part of the intermediation provided by 
trading markets.116  In theory, they reconcile mismatches between cap-
ital sources and uses, typically interest rate, creditworthiness, and cur-
rency differentials. They act just like bank capital reserves in the 
commercial bank intermediation model. 
For example, a company or government can enter into a deriva-
tive, contract with a bank to synthetically convert the form of an obli-
gation into another form.  Using derivatives, an investor who seeks a 
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ten-year, fixed rate bond denominated in Euros can be a source of 
funds for a company seeking a floating rate loan denominated in U.S. 
dollars.  The company can synthetically convert the bond that the in-
vestor wants to buy into funding based on terms that the company 
wants to procure. 
In our example, the company enters into a swap contract with a 
bank.  Under the contract, the company receives payments equal to 
its fixed rate interest payment obligation and it pays the bank an 
amount equal to the interest obligation that it would have had if the 
interest obligation had been at a floating rate.  The investor is paid its 
fixed rate interest indirectly by the bank and the company pays float-
ing amounts to the bank.  The company’s obligations denominated in 
Euros are similarly swapped with the bank for a like obligation de-
nominated in U.S. dollars.  Capital intermediation has been achieved 
and the mismatches have been reconciled.  The question is whether it 
has been achieved more or less efficiently than would be the case if 
alternatives had been used. 
Derivatives do not eliminate risk.117  They are contracts that ex-
change one set of future consequences from a price change for an-
other, assuming the other party performs.118  Picture a business whose 
profit and loss during a period in the future depends on price move-
ments of a commodity or security.  To avoid the consequences of an 
adverse price move, the business could establish a reserve from bor-
rowings or earnings.  Alternatively, it could enter into a swap that (as-
suming performance by the counterparty) fixes the consequence of 
this price exposure at the current price level. 
The distinctions between these alternatives—capital reserves and 
derivatives—should drive the decision between these two methods of 
managing the risk of price movement.  It is similar to the decision be-
tween buying insurance and self-insuring.  The structural differences 
between the two alternatives have been found to be relatively small 
(though the cited study fails to consider important risks that are em-
bedded in derivatives).119  If a reserve is used, the business must pay 
for the capital to fund it.  If a swap is used, the company pays the val-
ue of a beneficial price move if it occurs plus embedded charges.  If a 
reserve is used, the risk is that an adverse price move has consequenc-
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es beyond the reserve.  If a swap is used, the basic risk is that the 
counterparty fails to perform, but swaps involve many other risks as 
well. 120 
The relative profitability of derivatives is legendary.  In 2007, I 
made a proposal to the head of an energy division of one of the larg-
est banks in the world whose responsibilities included lending to en-
ergy companies.  The bank had allocated a large amount of credit ca-
pacity for certain companies to its derivatives desk.  I suggested that 
the bank transfer some of the credit capacity for certain energy com-
panies to the lending group.  This would enable the companies to use 
loan proceeds to collateralize derivatives credit exposures to the bank 
rather than merely grow exposures organically by transacting deriva-
tives.  The collateralization would be done through a system my com-
pany had developed to increase the efficiency of derivatives credit risk 
management.  If the bank charged uniformly for the extension of 
credit, it would be indifferent as to the allocation of the credit capaci-
ty since the exposure to the bank would be the same.  Under my pro-
posal, the exposure would be under a loan and the derivatives expo-
sure would be fully collateralized with treasury securities.  Therefore, 
the aggregate exposure would be the same.  It appeared to be a mat-
ter of form rather than substance, but the customer would benefit 
from the increased risk management efficiency my company would 
provide. 
The derivatives desk refused to re-allocate the credit capacity be-
cause the bank explained that its profit from credit extension embed-
ded in derivatives was ten times the profit that could be earned from 
making a loan.  This experience confirmed what was commonly un-
derstood to be true.121  Because the pricing of derivatives was so com-
plex, customers almost never understood how much a bank charged 
for entering into the derivative.122  Assuming that this price disparity is 
accurate, the price for credit embedded in a derivative would be ten 
times the price for a loan to fund a reserve.  The amount extracted by 
the financial sector is ten times more than the same lending transac-
tion. 
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This practice constitutes a massive distortion of the credit mar-
kets.  In an efficient market, credit is priced similarly regardless of 
how it is deployed.  Credit capacity is finite.  The companies and gov-
ernments seeking capital financing are constrained when available 
capacity is depleted.  The large disparity in the profitability of lending 
and derivatives credit extension means that the businesses and gov-
ernments will be prevented from tapping into capital lending sources 
or will pay more for scarcer capacity.  It would be different if the cred-
it extension were ten times more valuable to the company or govern-
ment than a loan.  Academic research suggests, however, that this is 
not the case, especially when the research is read in the context of the 
practical use of derivatives in the marketplace.123 
Despite their enormous relative cost, companies and govern-
ments still use derivatives to hedge risks.  Sometimes derivatives are 
used to obscure the truth from others.  That was the case with the 
government of Greece, which entered in to an off-market swap with 
credit extended by the bank at inception to meet the European Un-
ion debt ratios.  But far more often, the complexity of derivatives 
hides their true cost from the companies and governments that use 
them.  A study by Gamba & Triantis, while the most comprehensive 
available, nonetheless fails to master the incredible complexity of 
even a relatively simple swap transaction,124 illustrating clearly that de-
rivatives are difficult to value.  More complex derivatives are even 
more challenging as additional risks compound the valuation prob-
lem.  It is completely unrealistic to believe that participants in the de-
rivatives markets accurately value the transactions that they enter into.  
A recent study describes this problem: 
 The practical downside of using derivatives is that they are 
complex assets that are difficult to price.  Since their values 
depend on complex interaction of numerous attributes, the 
issuer can easily tamper derivatives without anybody being 
able to detect it within a reasonable amount of time.  Studies 
suggest that valuations for a given product by different so-
phisticated investment banks can be easily 17% apart and 
that even a single bank’s evaluations of different tranches of 
the same derivative may be mutually inconsistent.125 
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Under these conditions, it is clear that the very complexity of valua-
tion of derivatives constitutes a major inefficiency in the intermedia-
tion of capital sources and capital uses. 
The inadequate valuation of derivatives imposes inefficiencies 
and costs on the intermediation of capital in the financial markets 
and contributes to the increased cost of intermediation observed by 
Professor Philippon.126  Sophisticated banks understand valuation far 
better than their customers, a major asymmetry of information.127  In 
this way, the financial sector extracts value from the financial markets 
through derivatives prices that are rarely understood by customers. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The evaluation of the costs and benefits of limiting human activi-
ty through regulation is an ongoing and important discussion.  When 
the activity is commercial, the discourse is subject to a bias that re-
stricting activity reduces productivity in the economy to the detriment 
of wealth creation.  When a politician says that a rule is “unduly bur-
densome,” he means that the discernible benefits do not outweigh the 
wealth that would be created if the rule did not exist.  Today, the most 
sophisticated and powerful articulation of this concerns the regula-
tion of the financial markets through financial markets reform under 
existing and potential future legislation. 
This debate suffers from preconceptions that rely on unfounded 
economic theory and misconceptions based on the sheer complexity 
of modern finance.  The first challenge is to establish how to measure 
the value of a market structure that is defined by a given set of regula-
tions.  The best measure looks to the structure’s value to society.  The 
primary function of financial markets in this context is the intermedi-
ation of capital investment.  If capital intermediation is efficient in a 
construct, the rent extracted by the financial sector for facilitating 
that function should be proportionate to the value added. 
The evidence shows that this is not the case.  The predominant 
approach that emphasizes the cost of individual financial transactions 
is clearly inadequate.  The leading theory implicitly assumes that capi-
tal intermediation can be viewed as a linear path of a unit of invest-
ment from an investor to a productive use.  In this view, the costs of 
individual transactions along the way determine the cost of the capital 
intermediation process. 
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This is naïve or intentionally misleading.  Modern capital and de-
rivatives markets are exceedingly complex and involve multiple meth-
ods for extraction of value by the financial sector that must be paid 
for by the productive economy.  The amount extracted is demonstra-
bly far higher than historic data or reasoned analysis suggests could 
possibly be reasonable.  The rents extracted by the financial sector for 
intermediating capital investment are inefficiently high. 
The cause of this inefficiency is asymmetric information.  The fi-
nancial sector is incentivized to promote complexity to maximize the 
value of information asymmetry.  A byproduct is increased risk of cat-
astrophic financial crises. 
The costs and benefits of financial market regulation should not 
be biased by the assumption that the restriction of activities is a bur-
den that must be offset by legitimate benefits such as safety and 
soundness of the system or even price transparency.  Under this ap-
proach, regulations that reduce complexity or market power do not 
prohibit the financial system from providing its essential social func-
tion, but very likely enhance the efficiency of that process. 
